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COVID-19 and Regulating
Vaccines
Dorit Reiss
Vaccine controversies are not new, but the COVID-19 pandemic has brought them to
the forefront, and directed attention to the question of vaccine safety and regulation.
This essay explores how vaccines are regulated, and how this applies to COVID-19
vaccines. What I hope to demonstrate is that while no regulatory framework is perfect,
we have a strong set of monitoring mechanisms available to oversee vaccine safety.
COVID-19 pandemic, the first vaccines
have been brought to market less than a
year after the pandemic started. It is reasonable to wonder whether the speed of
development—combined with the interests of the pharmaceutical companies to
seize the potential market provided by
COVID-19—allowed sufficient oversight and whether the end result is as
safe as routine vaccines.
This article addresses the process of
creating vaccines. It then explains the
system in place for monitoring them.

Creating Vaccines
Normally, the process of creating vaccines takes years. Before COVID-19
vaccines, the fastest vaccine to be developed was the mumps vaccine, which took
four years in the 1960s—before modern standards. Influenza vaccines are
updated annually, but the only thing to
be changed for them is the active ingredients—the strain of the virus—while their
formula and the facilities to produce
them remain the same. During a pandemic, waiting years means loss of life
and extensive harm. We may still have
had to do that, if the first vaccines had
(Courtesy of NIAID, National Institute of Health, via Flickr CC by 2.0)

COVID-19, Vaccines, and COVID-19
Vaccines
Our world is not as it was before 2020.
COVID-19, a new and especially tricky
virus, changed our reality—legally, economically, and practically. Over the past
year and some, more than three million
people world-wide, and over half a million people in the United States, died
from COVID-19. Millions more were
impacted, some by spending weeks in
the hospital, some by suffering long-term
harm, and some by suffering severe economic consequences (and these categories, of course, overlap).
In response to the pandemic, public
health authorities at the local and state
level put in place an unprecedented program of restrictions, including stay-athome orders and mask orders. A year
later, not all restrictions have been lifted.
The United States experienced several
crises where states ran out of ICU capacity. The economic and human effects of
the pandemic are staggering.
Our way out of the pandemic is multifaceted, but a large part of it is vaccines.
Vaccines are among the most important
medical advances in history, responsible
for preventing extensive deaths, disability, disease and economic harm. Vaccines
are also extremely safe.1 But those vaccines have been developed over the
course of years. In the context of the

Finally, it evaluates the effectiveness of
this system in overseeing vaccine safety
and identifying problems.

A National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) scientist researches the COVID-19
vaccine, January 30, 2020.
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not met safety and effectiveness milestones. We got lucky: the first COVID19 vaccines exceeded expectations.
The usual process for bringing a vaccine to market involves identifying the
germ and identifying the target for a vaccine candidate, followed by preclinical
studies in animals and three stages of
trials in humans—increasing from a small
number (tens) of healthy volunteers to
large clinical trials of the target population, consisting of thousands or tens of
thousands.2 This process normally takes
years. Most vaccines fail the first stage of
clinical trials and never make it to market.
This could have happened to COVID19 vaccines, but did not.
The rationale behind the process for
vaccines—longer and more demanding
than for most products—is that because
vaccines are given to healthy individuals,
to prevent a disease, they are held to
a very high safety standard. Our tolerance for risk is lower for vaccines than
for drugs given to address an existing
condition. Although the pandemic context complicates the analysis, because the
risks of the pandemic are also immediate and glaring, we still are unlikely to
accept vaccines that cause harm more
than very rarely—as demonstrated in the
case of the clots that may (or may not)
be caused by the Johnson and Johnson
(J&J) vaccines.
Although the speed of production may
raise concerns about cutting corners, that
is not what happened. We arrived at
fast vaccines against SARS-CoV-2, the
virus that causes COVID-19, thanks to
three things, and some luck. The three
important factors were previous developments in areas of research crucial for
the creation of these specific vaccines;
concentrated attention by many teams of
talented scientists on the issue; and the
infusion of large amounts of government
money that allowed companies to take
financial risks they could not otherwise
take (without compromising safety). This
discussion will focus on the mRNA vaccines produced by Pfizer-BioNtech and
Moderna, because addressing all vaccines would take too long. In the discus-

sion of safety monitoring, I will use the
Johnson and Johnson vaccine and blood
clots to show the surveillance system at
work.
The process began with a germ that
was already known. Early on, through
global surveillance, scientists identified SARS-CoV-2, a new coronavirus,
as the culprit behind the new disease;
and relatively soon, they narrowed in
on the virus’s spike protein (a protein
on the surface of the virus that allows
it to go into cells) as the target for vaccines. Immediately, several companies
began working on a variety of vaccine
candidates.
This work benefited from two lines
of research already in existence. Before,
but especially since, the emergence of
deadly outbreaks caused by other coronaviruses that target humans (the SARS
outbreak in 2002–2003 and the MERS
outbreak in 2012), teams of researchers
have spent years or decades studying
coronaviruses. Although SARS-CoV-2
can and did surprise us in many ways,
by the time of the pandemic there was a
body of knowledge about coronaviruses,
and a body of work that looked at creating vaccines against them, though no vaccines had yet been made.3 So the work on
creating vaccines for the pandemic did
not start from scratch; in fact, the focus
on the spike protein was the result of
previous work. Another line of previous
work that helped was the development,
over years, of RNA (ribonucleic acid)
vaccines. These vaccines have not yet
been market-ready, but they have been
the focus of work of several scientists
and companies over previous years.4 The
vaccines themselves have initially gone
through animal studies, though the first
stage studies in human volunteers (with
a small number of healthy volunteers)
started before the end of the animal studies. However, the vaccines did not move
forward to large clinical trials until strong
data came out of both sets: animal studies, and first stage human studies.
During spring 2020, the federal government stepped in. The government
offered hundreds of millions of dollars
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to the companies making the vaccines.
Normally, companies do not start stage
III trials until they have very strong data
from stage I and II. That is because stage
III trials are very expensive. But government money changed the equation: companies could move on to stage III with
more limited data, with no financial risk
to themselves.
The process combined stage II and
stage III trials. That sometimes happens, but not always. In July 2020, both
Moderna and Pfizer-BioNTech started
clinical trials. The trials included over
30,000 participants for Moderna, over
40,000 for Pfizer-BioNTech, half in
the control group, half in the placebo
group. In late November, Pfizer submitted results to the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), and Moderna
did so shortly after. The FDA experts
reviewed the data and found it to justify
granting an Emergency Use Authorization
(EUA). FDA then convened its external
expert committee (the Vaccines and
Related Biological Products Advisory
Committee, VRBPAC), which in a
lengthy public meeting reviewed the data
and supported granting an EUA for both
vaccines.
The data was extremely strong. Both
mRNA vaccines were over 90% effective against symptomatic COVID-19—a
very high rate of vaccine effectiveness.
They were also both highly effective at
preventing severe diseases. The FDA
said it would want to see over 50%
effectiveness to grant an EUA; these far
exceeded it. There were also no safety
signals in the trials: while large numbers of people who got the vaccines had
temporary unpleasant side effects (a day
of fever, fatigue, pains at the injection
site), there were no indication of serious
harms from the vaccines.
The authorization was followed by
additional review by the Centers for
Disease Control’s (CDC) expert advisory
committee (the Advisory Committee on
Immunization Practices), which recommends vaccines for the appropriate populations—and engages in another review
of the data. The Committee includes

experts in relevant fields, as well as a
consumer representative.
The clinical trials were as large or
larger than those for routine vaccines,
and the data were stronger than is the
case for most vaccines. The EUA had
a very strong basis behind it, as strong
as many licenses, even if the duration
of time for which data had been available was shorter. There remained open
questions: would the vaccines prevent
infection? How long would immunity
last? But the bottom line is still that the
vaccines went through large clinical trials,
were presented to the FDA with very
strong data behind them, and earned
the authorization. A second review was
undertaken by a separate independent
expert committee, which confirmed the
result.
Post Marketing Approval
Vaccine monitoring continues after a
vaccine is licensed, even in routine times,
and the CDC prepared to provide additional monitoring to the usual systems
for COVID-19 vaccines. The reason for
that is that clinical trials are too small
to identify a very rare side effect. Even
large clinical trials that consist of tens of
thousands of people would not catch a
one in a hundred thousand or one in a
million side effect. But we want to know
of such a risk. Among other things, it may
mean that some populations should not
be vaccinated—if a type of individual
is at higher risk, that individual may be
protected by herd immunity. Second, it
can help doctors and vaccinators identify a problem after a vaccine and treat
it appropriately, reducing or preventing
harm. For example, knowing that mRNA
vaccines have a higher rate of allergic
reactions among people with previous
allergies to certain things led to those
people being asked to wait 30 minutes
at a vaccination site rather than 15, so
they can be treated if a reaction occurs.
Even in regular times, four monitoring systems exist to cover vaccine safety.5
The first is the Vaccine Adverse Events
Reporting System (VAERS), which is
a passive reporting system to which

anyone can submit a report of something that happened after a vaccine. By
its nature, VAERS accepts any report;
so the existence of a report does not
confirm the veracity of an event—and
certainly does not prove a link to the
vaccine. In spite of that, anti-vaccine
activists have been misusing VAERS
reports to try and create fear and doubt
about COVID-19 vaccines—whether
by pointing to the number of unverified
reports as if it shows the risks of the vaccines, or by taking individual reports and
presenting them as fact and as evidence
of vaccine harm—a highly problematic
practice, given the unverified nature of
these reports.6 VAERS have an important role to play in catching safety signals. Reports can lead to investigations
that can show problems. But treating raw
reports as evidence of vaccine harms is
simply incorrect.
A second monitoring system is the
Vaccine Safety Datalink. This is a collaboration between the CDC and health-
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care organizations throughout the country, covering over nine million people.
This is an active monitoring system: it
uses computerized programs to actively
look for signals, and allows researchers to
conduct studies on questions that come
up. A third, the Post-Licensure Rapid
Immunization Safety Monitoring System
(PRISM) is part of the FDA Sentinel
system, a system for monitoring medical
products by tracking health insurance
claims, using a much larger database
and also actively monitoring. Fourth
is the Clinical Immunization Safety
Assessment Project (CISA), where providers can ask questions about unusual
cases, including whether something is a
contraindication, or whether a medical
problem may be vaccine related. The
CISA project also conducts research on
specific issues and special populations
(like HIV patients).
In addition to these systems, in preparation for the COVID-19 vaccines
rollout, the CDC set out the Vaccine

Safety Assessment for Essential Workers,
V-SAFE. Under the program, people
sign up with their cellphone number
after being vaccinated, and receive a
text from CDC with a link to fill a short
health report—daily for the first week,
weekly afterwards for six weeks. If a
problem is found, the program involves
providing assistance to the recipient to
file a VAERS report.
At every meeting of the Advisory
Committee on Immunization Practices
(ACIP) since the beginning of the vaccines’ rollout, CDC officials present a
detailed description of the safety data.
Multiple studies have also looked at
specific safety issues, like the safety of
the vaccines in pregnancy, at this point.
An example of how these systems work
is the recent discussion of rare blood
clots after the J&J vaccine. During the
early months of 2021, reports in Europe
pointed to rare blood clots happening
after the AstraZeneca COVID-19 vaccine. That vaccine was not yet authorized in the United States. But in early
April, United States agencies took note
of six cases of a rare type of blood
clot—cerebral venous sinus thrombosis
(CVST)—reported to VAERS among
the 6.8 million doses of J&J vaccines
distributed at that point. The reaction
was immediate. On April 13, 2021, CDC
and FDA issued a joint statement pausing administration of the J&J vaccine
“out of an abundance of caution.”7 The
concern was not just that there might be
a link between the vaccine and a rare
and serious disorder (two of the people
involved were hospitalized, and one
died), but that the treatment needed to
be different than the usual treatment of
blood clots (administering heparin, an
anticoagulant drug usually used for clots,
could, in these cases, make things worse).
The CDC convened ACIP on April
14, 2021, and the committee met for five
hours to look at the different cases and
consider them. ACIP concluded that it
did not have enough data, and, therefore,
did not lift the pause. The decision (like
the earlier decision to declare a pause)
was controversial. Some experts pointed

out that in the context of the pandemic,
pausing the distribution of a vaccine (the
only vaccine we have that is one dose
and does not require high levels of cold
storage) costs lives, and that even if there
is a causal link, the events are very rare.
Others emphasized the need to be especially cautious with COVID-19 vaccines,
since people are watching them closely
and trust in them is crucial to reaching
sufficient uptake in a pandemic. ACIP
met again on April 23, 2021, and after
over six hours of discussion decided to
lift the pause, concluding, by majority
vote, that the benefits outweighed the
risk. The four dissenters agreed that the
vaccine should be unpaused, but would
have sent a clearer message to providers
and more information to recipients on
the risk. While the risks may not be as
rare as one in a million (there is a chance
the reports did not capture all the events),
they do appear, at this point, to be very
rare.8 There may also be a causal connection.
This event teaches us several lessons.
First, it teaches us that the systems we
have have the ability to detect events
when the signal is as rare as one per
million. Second, it teaches us that when
a signal is detected, it is taken seriously—
and regulators react (and according to
some observers, overreact). Third, it
teaches us that such events are publicly
and transparently discussed. While we
may be tempted to think this is unique
to the charged context of COVID-19,
when an early rotavirus vaccine was
taken off the market because of a serious side effect in one per ten thousand
babies, that, too, received media attention.9
The takeaway is that we have very
robust systems to oversee vaccine safety,
and they have the capacity to identify
even rare problems. Vaccine safety is
taken seriously by regulators and observers, and the process to address problems
is transparent, deliberative (though not
necessarily fast), and in-depth.
This combination is what makes vaccines in the United States so safe, with
such low risks.
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